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STATE V. WORTHEN: DEMONSTRATING UTAH’S NEED FOR AN 
EXPANDED, ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGE 
 
Barry G. Stratford* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Evidentiary privileges have generated disagreement since they were first 
recognized in the law.1 These privileges exist to prevent a witness from being 
compelled to disclose certain information. Such protections acknowledge that 
certain relationships2 or communications3 are so important in society that they 
warrant heightened confidentiality. A number of privileges are designed to protect 
communications made during professional relationships. These include the 
relationship between attorney and client,4 physician and patient,5 psychotherapist 
and patient,6 and clergyman and penitent.7 In practice, these privileges require 
“some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of 
justice.”8 When parties seek communications and records arising from these 
relationships, the search for truth must occasionally yield to the protection of 
																																																								
* © 2013 Barry G. Stratford; J.D., University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law, 
2012; M.P.P., University of Utah, 2009; Law Clerk for the Honorable Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Presiding Judge, Utah Court of Appeals, 2012–2013. The author prepared this Article in his 
personal capacity and the opinions expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect 
the views of Judge McHugh, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the State of Utah. 
1 Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 
1456–58 (1985). 
2 For a utilitarian justification arguing that testimonial privileges are judicial 
instruments used to effect important practical social aims, see 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (John T. McNaughton, rev. ed. 
1961). See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1996) (outlining one justification for 
evidentiary privileges in a discussion on the importance of the relationship that exists 
between psychotherapists or social workers and their patients). 
3 For a nonutilitarian justification for privileges based on the privacy protections they 
provide, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An 
Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 86 (1973). 
4 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (recognizing attorney-
client privilege as “one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential 
communications”). 
5 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize a doctor-patient privilege at the 
federal level. However, almost every state has recognized the privilege to some degree 
either through statute or case law. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-137(4) (LexisNexis 
2008) (establishing the Utah physician-patient privilege). 
6 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9–13. 
7 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 387 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing 
clergy-communicant privilege). 
8 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 339 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
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individual and societal interests. Such a balance preserves the integrity of these 
valued relationships. 
In recent decades, one evidentiary privilege has gained increased legal 
recognition: the victim-counselor privilege.9 Similar to the protections found under 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the victim-counselor privilege seeks to 
protect communications between victims of crimes—almost exclusively child 
abuse and sexual assaults such as rape and incest—and their crisis counselors.10 
Unlike the psychotherapist privilege, the victim-counselor privilege is necessary to 
protect communications with crisis counselors who may be unlicensed or 
volunteers with training requirements much lower than those of licensed 
psychotherapists.11 
A number of public policy concerns support this privilege, including the 
understanding that the confidential communications between victims and their 
therapists are critical to effective treatment and recovery.12 Similarly, the victims’ 
rights movement has made significant progress in gaining legal protections for 
victims through federal legislation, state legislation, and state constitutional 
amendments.13 
Occasionally, a conflict may develop in criminal cases between the victim-
counselor privilege and a criminal defendant’s right to due process,14 compulsory 
process,15 and confrontation.16 Professor Paul Cassell, a prominent crime victim 
scholar, framed this issue by noting, “When defense attorneys obtain ex parte 
subpoenas for a victim’s confidential information, they may very well violate the 
																																																								
9 See, e.g., People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 643 (Colo. 2005) (noting justifications for 
victim-counselor privilege); Euphemia B. Warren, She’s Gotta Have it Now: A Qualified 
Rape Crisis Counselor-Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 146–48 (1995). 
10 For a general discussion regarding the historical development of the victim-
counselor privilege, see Anne W. Robinson, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusionary 
Rule: Dual Justifications for an Absolute Rape Victim Counselor Privilege, 31 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 331, 337–41 (2005). 
11 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-203(3) (LexisNexis 2008). 
12 See, e.g., Louis Everstine et al., Privacy and Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 35 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 828, 836 (1980); Ryan D. Jagim et al., Mental Health Professionals’ 
Attitudes Toward Confidentiality, Privilege, and Third-Party Disclosure, 9 PROF. 
PSYCHOLOGY 458, 459–60 (1978); Anna Y. Joo, Note, Broadening the Scope of 
Counselor-Patient Privilege to Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault Survivor, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255, 264 (1995). 
13 DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 28–31 (3d ed. 2010). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Compulsory Process Clause was later made obligatory 
on the states by passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14, 17–19 (1967). 
16 U.S. CONST. amend VI. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–06 (1965). 
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rights of the victim, such as the right to confidentiality preserved in the doctor-
patient privilege or psychotherapist privilege.”17 
The United States Supreme Court confronted the convergence of these rights 
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,18 weighing a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights 
against a victim’s right to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.19 The success of 
the crime victims’ rights movement may create a presumption that there is strong 
support for a victim’s confidentiality privilege. However, far from resolving the 
conflict of rights, the Court’s less-than-clear analysis has been accorded various 
interpretations by state and federal courts.20 Because the conflict between a victim 
and a criminal defendant surfaces in a variety of contexts relating to the 
evidentiary privileges, the patchwork of approaches provides inconsistent guidance 
for how courts should handle a victim’s privileged communications when it is 
pitted against the rights of a criminal defendant.21 
The Utah Supreme Court recently faced this convergence of rights in State v. 
Worthen.22 The court evaluated whether a child victim’s privileged psychological 
records should remain confidential despite defendant’s claim that the records were 
necessary to his defense.23 While the court indicated that a broader victims’ rights 
issue—whether Utah’s victims’ statutory and constitutional protections should 
influence a criminal defendant’s ability to overcome a victim’s right to privilege—
was open for judicial review, the court declined to make such a determination 
because appellant failed to properly raise it on appeal.24 
This case demonstrates the need for the Utah Legislature to act and remove 
any doubt that crime victims deserve an expanded, absolute victim-counselor 
testimonial privilege. The underlying policy rationales of privileges in general and 
concerns about the victims of crime in particular support an absolute privilege. 
Victims’ rights recognized by legislation and state constitutional amendments also 
call for such a privilege. Lastly, the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that 
an individual has a constitutional right to privacy underscores the need to protect 
confidential communications made during counseling.25 In short, the rights 
																																																								
17 Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 907. 
18 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
19 See id. at 56–60. 
20 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 136, at 569–73; see infra text 
accompanying notes 117–157. 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Shrader, 716 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470–72 (S.D. W. Va. 
2010). 
22 222 P.3d 1144 (Utah 2009). 
23 Id. at 1147. 
24 Id. at 1158. 
25 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (reaffirming constitutional 
protection for privacy and applying it to private, consensual homosexual sexual activity); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing “that a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution”); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (finding that a law prohibiting the 
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afforded to all crime victims should be no less important than the rights afforded to 
criminal defendants. 
Part II of this Article explores the victim-counselor privilege. This section 
identifies the states that recognize the privilege and discusses the three common 
versions of the privilege: qualified, semi-absolute, and absolute. Part III explores 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that address a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights to access privileged information. This section also 
discusses the approaches that other courts, both state and federal, have taken when 
addressing the balance between a victim’s privileged, confidential communications 
and a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Part IV discusses Utah’s statutory 
law and case law that underlie victims’ rights to privileged communication. This 
section also includes an analysis of the Utah Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
State v. Worthen. In Part V, this Article uses State v. Worthen to advocate for an 
absolute victim-counselor confidentiality privilege for all crime victims that seek 
counseling, not just the traditional protections offered to victims of child abuse and 
sexual assault. The underlying public policy interests of privileges in general, the 
policy interests regarding victims of crime in particular, and crime victims’ 
statutory and constitutional rights, all support establishing an absolute victim-
counselor testimonial privilege. Part VI concludes. 
 
II.  THE VICTIM-COUNSELOR EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE 
 
Communication between a counselor and the victim of a crime may qualify as 
confidential under several evidentiary privileges. For example, the federal 
government and all fifty states recognize some iteration of the privilege between 
psychotherapists26 and their patients.27 Thus, crime victims who seek counseling 
from a psychotherapist can expect that their communications and reports—and 
sometimes their doctor’s reports—will remain confidential in certain 
																																																																																																																																												
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons impaired the exercise of personal 
rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut 
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives as violating an individual’s right to privacy). 
26 Note, however, that state psychotherapist-patient privileges vary from state to state 
regarding the exact qualifications required of a psychologist, therapist, counselor, social 
worker, or other professional, and which of these professions actually create a privilege. 
Compare UTAH R. EVID. 506 (recognizing Utah’s qualified privilege between patients and 
mental health therapists such as physicians, psychologists, and clinical or certified social 
workers), with UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38-201 to -204 (LexisNexis 2008) (recognizing 
Utah’s absolute victim-counselor privilege between victims and a “sexual assault 
counselor” that “has a minimum of [forty] hours of training in counseling and assisting 
victims of sexual assault”). 
27 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 n.11, 15 (1996) (recognizing a federal 
evidentiary privilege between psychotherapists and their patients and listing statutes from 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia that recognize the privilege). 
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circumstances.28 While the doctor-patient privilege does not exist on the federal 
level, most states have adopted some version of this privilege.29 Likewise, this 
privilege may protect crime victims in some instances. 
As of 2012, forty states have enacted some protections of confidentiality for 
communications between victims of sexual assault and their counselors.30 This 
privilege mirrors other advancements in the expansion of the rights of rape victims, 
such as rape shield laws, which serve to limit the introduction of evidence 
regarding a victim’s past sexual conduct, history, or reputation.31 
But even in states that have enacted a specific victim-counselor privilege, the 
protections vary considerably.32 For example, in some jurisdictions, the victim-
counselor privilege encompasses the written records of rape crisis counselors and 
centers,33 while other jurisdictions protect oral testimony of victims and their 
counselors in addition to written records.34 The broad enactment of these privileges 
“demonstrates a recognition by a majority of state legislatures that the sexual 
assault counseling relationship services a valuable societal function in helping 
victims recover from the traumatic experience of a sexual assault.”35 Nonetheless, 
no federal victim-counselor privilege exists, as neither the Supreme Court nor 
Congress has formulated this particular privilege. 
																																																								
28 For an exploration of the argument that “[t]hough the [Jaffee] Court purported to 
create an absolute privilege, in actuality it recognized a privilege without defining its 
contours,” see Molly Rebecca Bryson, Note, Protecting Confidential Communications 
Between a Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 
1004 (1997). 
29 See John Jennings, Note, The Physician-Patient Relationship: The Permissibility of 
Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians and Defense Counsel, 
59 MO. L. REV. 441, 451 (1994). 
30 Confidentiality Laws, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK, 
http://rainn.org/public-policy/laws-in-your-state/ (click on a state; then click on 
“Confidentiality Protections” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). The following states 
and territories do not have a statutory privilege for communications between a rape 
counselor and victims of sexual assault: Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Guam, Idaho, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Id. (citing, e.g., Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 
(R.I. 1983) (determining that an absolute privilege protecting communications would be 
unconstitutional and that, if enacted, a victim-counselor privilege must include the 
possibility of in camera review)). 
31 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (barring most evidence offered to prove “that any 
alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior” or “any alleged victim’s sexual 
predisposition”). 
32 See Major Paul M. Schimpf, Talk the Talk; Now Walk the Walk: Giving an 
Absolute Privilege to Communications Between a Victim and Victim-Advocate in the 
Military, 185 MIL. L. REV. 149, 183 (2005). 
33 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-623 (2005). 
34 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5035(2) (2000). 
35 RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK, PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
BETWEEN SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS AND COUNSELORS 5 (2011). 
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The victim-counselor privilege exists within three general categories of 
varying force and application: qualified, semi-absolute, or absolute.36 A qualified 
privilege typically affords a defendant some opportunity to access the records for 
developing a defense.37 Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have a victim-
counselor privilege that is qualified by statute.38 This qualified privilege is 
accomplished by giving a judge or administrator the discretion to hold an in 
camera review of privileged records when a defendant satisfies an initial threshold 
of relevance by showing, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
probative value of the records will outweigh the prejudicial effect on a victim’s 
recovery.39 The judge then balances the interests, “reviewing the policy reasons for 
the privilege and weighing any harm that the victim may suffer as a result of 
revealing information contained in the confidence with any potential probative or 
exculpatory value the evidence may contain.”40 The exact procedures vary from 
state to state. For example, some states even go so far as to allow for a defense 
attorney to access a victim’s records directly.41 As a result, this qualified privilege 
may give no actual notice to victims as to whether their communications would be 
protected as privileged. 
The semi-absolute privilege offers more protections for victims of crime. 
While the privilege may seem absolute, court decisions have concluded that an in 
camera review or outright waiver of the privileged information may be necessary 
when a defendant’s constitutional rights of due process, confrontation, and 
compulsory process are implicated. Eight states have a semi-absolute victim-
counselor privilege that is, in some manner, qualified by judicial decision.42 
The Michigan victim-counselor privilege is one such example.43 The 
Michigan statute articulates the privilege as: any “confidential communication, or 
any report, working paper, or statement . . . between a victim and a sexual assault 
																																																								
36 See id. at 8–10. 
37 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-C:1–10 (LexisNexis 2001). 
38 D.C. CODE §§ 7-1201.01–.04 (LexisNexis 2008); see Confidentiality Laws, supra 
note 30. Those states with a privilege qualified by statute include Arizona, California, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana (limiting privilege to civil proceedings only pursuant to LA. 
CODE EVID. art. 510(b)(1)), Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon (providing no privilege for communications; however, 
all information maintained by a sexual assault crisis center or crisis line relating to clients 
is confidential pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. § 409.273(2)(b) (2011)), Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Confidentiality Laws, supra note 30. 
39 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-C:5. The statute also requires that the 
information be unavailable from another source and that nondisclosure would inhibit a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. 
40 JESSICA MINDLIN & LIANI JEAN HEH REEVES, THE NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW 
INST., CONFIDENTIALITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 14 (2005). 
41 See Joo, supra note 12, at 283. 
42 See Confidentiality Laws, supra note 30. Those states with a semiabsolute privilege 
qualified by judicial decision include Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota. Id. 
43 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 600.2157a (LexisNexis 2004). 
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or domestic violence counselor, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or 
criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim.”44 However, 
when interpreting this statute, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the 
privilege must yield to a defendant’s constitutional rights.45 Thus, trial judges are 
required to conduct an in camera review of the privileged records once the 
defendant has shown a reasonable probability that the records contain information 
material to the defendant’s case.46 As a result, a court modifies the absolute nature 
of the privilege and, without giving choice to the victim whether to waive the 
privilege, the privilege shifts away from the victim entirely to the discretion of the 
courts. 
Other states provide for an absolute victim-counselor privilege, under which 
the victim is the only individual who can decide whether to waive this right.47 
Seven states and Puerto Rico have an absolute privilege that is not qualified by 
statute or diluted through judicial review.48 These statutes do not contain language 
suggesting that judicial review of the confidential communication or records is 
necessary or appropriate.49 Because a defendant is “denied access to an entire class 
of potentially useful evidence,” these types of absolute privileges are often 
challenged as excessively restrictive to a defendant’s constitutional rights.50 
 
III.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES TO THE 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE AND A DEFENDANT’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
The United States Supreme Court has been unclear regarding the extent to 
which a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights must limit evidentiary privileges, 
if at all. As a result, while most states afford victims some protections under the 
victim-counselor privilege, their force and application vary by jurisdiction. Five 
cases provide much of the Court’s analysis in this area: Brady v. Maryland,51 
Washington v. Texas,52 Davis v. Alaska,53 United States v. Nixon,54 and 
																																																								
44 Id. § 600.2157a(2). 
45 People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 575 (Mich. 1994). 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(k)(I) (2011). 
48 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 652 (2006); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 App. 4, Rule 26-A(B) 
(2000); see Confidentiality Laws, supra note 30. Those states with an absolute victim-
counselor privilege include: Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, and Vermont. Id. South Carolina’s privilege was established through judicial 
decision rather than statute when the South Carolina Supreme Court determined in State v. 
Trotter, 473 S.E.2d 452, 454–55 (S.C. 1996), that rape crisis counselor records are not 
subject to disclosure under S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(D). 
49 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(k)(I). 
50 RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
BETWEEN SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS AND COUNSELORS 9 (2011). 
51 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
52 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
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Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. This Article explores the Supreme Court’s approach in 
each of these cases. Because the Court’s precedent does not fully provide an 
answer to the conflict between victims’ rights and a criminal defendant’s rights, 
this Article also explores the approaches that other jurisdictions have used to 
address this conflict. 
 
A.  Constitutional Limitations on Privilege 
 
Due process, compulsory process, and confrontation issues may create limits 
on evidentiary privileges in criminal cases. As an initial matter, defendants have 
“no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”55 In Brady v. 
Maryland, the Court recognized that prosecutors are required to disclose evidence 
that is favorable to the accused or material to the accused’s guilt or punishment.56 
The Court clarified that this evidence is the kind that would deprive defendants of 
their right to a fair trial if not disclosed.57 However, the Court has consistently held 
that Brady has limits: “An interpretation of Brady to create a broad, 
constitutionally required right of discovery ‘would entirely alter the character and 
balance of our present systems of criminal justice.’”58 
Crime victims and the counselors holding their records “will only rarely—if 
ever—have information a defendant is constitutionally entitled to examine.”59 The 
decision in Brady requires only that state actors, namely prosecutors, have a 
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence.60 Because victims and their 
counselors are not state actors, they are not subject to Brady restrictions on state 
action.61 
In United States v. Hatch,62 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that “a failure to show that the records a defendant seeks are in the government’s 
possession is fatal to [a Brady] claim.”63 Other courts have agreed. In State ex rel. 
Romley v. Superior Court,64 the Arizona Court of Appeals noted “Brady 
emphasizes suppression of evidence by the prosecution, but does not require the 
victim to cooperate with the defense [to produce medical records held by the 
victim].”65 
																																																																																																																																												
53 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
54 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
55 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). 
56 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
57 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 
58 Id. at 675 n.7 (citation omitted). 
59 Cassell, supra note 17, at 915. 
60 See Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2004). 
61 See Cassell, supra note 17, at 914. 
62 162 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1998). 
63 Id. at 947 (citing United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
64 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
65 Id. at 452. 
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In the Eighth Circuit, a defendant cannot subpoena medical records of a 
witness66 or compel disclosure of witnesses’ medical and psychiatric records where 
“the government has no obligation to obtain for a defendant records that it does not 
already have in its possession or control.”67 In Goldsmith v. State,68 a Maryland 
court likewise found “no common law, court rule, statutory or constitutional 
requirement that a defendant be permitted pre-trial discovery of privileged records 
held by a third party.”69 
In Washington v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a criminal 
defendant’s rights under the Compulsory Process Clause apply to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.70 In doing so, the Court struck down a Texas 
statute that designated persons charged or convicted in the same crime as 
incompetent to testify on one another’s behalf.71 The Court noted, “Nothing in this 
opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges . . . which are 
based on entirely different considerations from those [considered in the current 
case].”72 
The Court held in Davis v. Alaska that a defendant’s right to cross-examine a 
witness under the Confrontation Clause outweighed Alaska’s statutory privilege 
for juvenile records.73 The Court found that the Alaskan statute denied the 
defendant the opportunity to introduce a witness’s probationary status during 
cross-examination.74 “The State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of 
a juvenile offender’s record,” the Court said, “cannot require yielding of so vital a 
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse 
witness.”75 The Court did not, however, require disclosure of the record.76 Instead, 
it remanded the case with the suggestion that Alaska could protect their witness’s 
record “by refraining from using him to make out its case.”77 
Lastly, in United States v. Nixon, the Court held that a claim of absolute 
privilege between the President and those who advise and assist him would not 
prevail “over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair 
administration of criminal justice.”78 The Court noted that a “generalized assertion 
of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending 
criminal trial.”79 
																																																								
66 See Skorniak, 59 F.3d at 755–56. 
67 United States v. Hall, 171 F.3d 1133, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999). 
68 651 A.2d 866 (Md. 1995). 
69 Id. at 873. 
70 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967). 
71 Id. at 19–23. 
72 Id. at 23 n.21. 
73 415 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1974). 
74 Id. at 315–18. 
75 Id. at 320. 
76 Id. at 320–21. 
77 Id. 
78 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). 
79 Id. 
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Together, these cases establish the historical framework for the Court’s 
analysis in determining the scope of an evidentiary privilege in the face of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights. The convergence of these rights was exactly what 
the Court faced in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, where it weighed a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights against a victim’s rights under Pennsylvania’s 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.80 
 
B.  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 
 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the United States Supreme Court balanced a 
state’s interests in protecting victims’ privileged communications against a 
defendant’s rights.81 Defendant George Ritchie was charged with numerous sexual 
offenses for raping his thirteen-year-old daughter.82 The daughter reported the rape 
to the police, who referred the matter to Pennsylvania’s Children and Youth 
Services agency.83 The defendant subpoenaed the agency during pretrial discovery, 
seeking access to the records related to his daughter’s allegations and other records 
from a separate investigation stemming from a report by an unidentified source 
that claimed the defendant’s children were being abused.84 
Asserting privilege under Pennsylvania law, Children and Youth Services 
refused to comply with the subpoena.85 The statute required that all reports and 
information obtained during the agency’s investigation must be kept confidential, 
subject to certain exceptions.86 The defendant argued he was entitled to the 
information “because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as 
well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence.”87 The trial judge denied the 
defendant’s motion and refused to order Children and Youth Services to disclose 
the files.88 The prosecution’s main witness against the defendant was his daughter, 
who was cross-examined at length at trial.89 The defendant was ultimately 
convicted on all counts and sentenced to three to ten years in prison.90 
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that denying access to the 
records violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation and 
compulsory process.91 The court held that the defendant’s lawyer should have been 
permitted to review the files “to search for any useful evidence” from “the eyes 
																																																								
80 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987). 
81 Id. 




86 Id.; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 6339(a) (West 2010). 
87 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 44–45. 
90 Id. at 45. 
91 Id. at 46. 
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and the perspective of an advocate.”92 Pennsylvania appealed and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.93 
First, a plurality of the Court addressed the defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
claim.94 Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Powell, White, and 
O’Connor, disagreed with the defendant that, by being denied access to the 
privileged records, his right to cross-examination had been violated.95 The plurality 
noted, “The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal 
defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right 
to conduct cross-examination.”96 
If the Clause were construed as the defendant had argued, it would “transform 
the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial 
discovery.”97 The right to confrontation “is a trial right, designed to prevent 
improper restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during 
cross-examination.”98 Since the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine his 
daughter, his confrontation right had not been violated.99 
In concluding that the Compulsory Process Clause “provides no greater 
protections . . . than those afforded by due process,” a majority of the Court 
declined to determine how and whether the two clauses differ, and chose instead to 
decide the issue under the Due Process clause.100 Justice Blackmun joined the 
plurality to find that “the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its 
possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or 
punishment.”101 Thus: 
 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of 
sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest 
necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances. This is not a case 
where a state statute grants [Children and Youth Services] the absolute 
authority to shield its files from all eyes. Rather, the Pennsylvania law 
provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, 
including when [Children and Youth Services] is directed to do so by 
court order.102 
 
Where “the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of [Children and 
Youth Services] records in judicial proceedings,” the court reasoned, “we cannot 
																																																								
92 Id. (citations omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 51–54. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 51. 
97 Id. at 52. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 54. 
100 Id. at 56. 
101 Id. at 57. 
102 Id. at 57–58 (citations omitted). 
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conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions.”103 
Therefore, given the absence of Pennsylvania’s state policy to the contrary, the 
Court reasoned that there could not be any belief “that relevant information would 
not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the 
information is ‘material’ to the defense of the accused.”104According to the 
plurality, the defendant did have a constitutional right to access material 
information contained within the agency’s files.105 
The defendant himself did not have a right to make determinations as to the 
materiality of the information.106 However, the defendant’s rights would be 
sufficiently protected through the trial court conducting an in camera review.107 
Furthermore, if a defendant is aware of specific information contained within the 
privileged material, “he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in 
favor of its materiality.”108 
The Court stated that it had “no opinion on whether the result in this case 
would have been different if the statute had protected the [Children and Youth 
Services] files from disclosure to anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial 
personnel.”109 Thus, while the Court suggested that a due process analysis might 
apply differently to an absolute privilege, it did not explicitly endorse the idea.110 
The total and full disclosure of the confidential information, however, “would 
sacrifice unnecessarily” the State’s “compelling interest in protecting its child-
abuse information.”111 
Next, the Court proceeded to outline and recognize some of the justifications 
underlying the victim’s privilege. Release of the records, even through defendant’s 
counsel, would have “seriously adverse effect[s]” on a state’s efforts to “uncover 
and treat abuse.”112 As an example, the Court said that because child victims are 
often the only witnesses to the crime and the child may endure overwhelming 
“feelings of vulnerability and guilt” when the abuser is a parent, it “is essential that 
the child have a state-designated person to whom he may turn, and to do so with 
the assurance of confidentiality.”113 Additionally, neighbors and relatives who 
suspect abuse may be more likely to report their suspicions if they are assured that 
their identities will be protected.114 
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The Court even went so far as to applaud Pennsylvania’s efforts to guarantee 
a victim’s confidentiality—calling the efforts “commendable.”115 The Court 
concluded by noting that this laudable purpose would be undermined, however, if 
disclosure of confidential material was required “upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may not recognize 
exculpatory evidence.”116 
The Court’s determination in Ritchie has left unclear how a defendant’s 
constitutional rights analysis would apply to an absolute evidentiary privilege. As a 
result, many jurisdictions have reached divergent conclusions under nearly 
identical fact patterns. 
 
C.  Other Jurisdictional Approaches 
 
Several jurisdictions have addressed the conflict between a defendant’s rights 
and evidentiary privileges, including the victim-counselor privilege. These 
arguments can be recast as “implicating a victim’s federal privacy and due process 
rights [creating] a scenario where a constitutional right is being balanced against 
another constitutional right.”117 This very concern has caused the victim-counselor 
evidentiary privilege to vary in force and applicability from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. The decisions of both state and federal courts are discussed below. 
Several state courts have held that an absolute victim-counselor privilege 
outweighs a defendant’s constitutional challenge. In Commonwealth v. Wilson,118 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once again weighed the statutory victim-
counselor privilege against a defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge. This time, 
the court upheld the absolute nature of the privilege.119 The court distinguished the 
circumstances in Wilson from Ritchie, noting that the privilege at issue in Wilson 
had been modified to be an absolute privilege.120 Likewise, in Commonwealth v. 
Kennedy,121 a defendant charged with sexually abusing his stepdaughter sought 
disclosure of the victim’s psychotherapy records.122 The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court found that the Commonwealth’s absolute victim-counselor privilege was not 
“subject to balancing against a defendant’s right of confrontation” where “such a 
balancing would, in effect, destroy the right which the privilege sought to 
protect.”123 
																																																								
115 Id. at 60–61. 
116 Id. at 61. 
117 NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST. AT LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH., CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS: A TOOLKIT FOR STATE COALITIONS 43 (2005). 
118 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992). 
119 Id. at 1296. 
120 Id. at 1297. 
121 604 A.2d 1036 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992). 
122 Id. at 1038. 
123 Id. at 1045. 
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In People v. Turner,124 the Colorado Supreme Court found that Colorado’s 
victim-advocate privilege was absolute and could only be waived by the victim.125 
In rejecting the defendant’s due process claim, the court relied on the Ritchie 
decision and other cases relating to its psychotherapist-patient privilege.126 The 
Turner court distinguished Ritchie on the grounds that Colorado’s victim-
counselor privilege was absolute.127 In like manner, the New Jersey Superior 
Court, in State v. J.G.,128 also distinguished the Ritchie decision and rejected a due 
process challenge to New Jersey’s victim-counselor privilege.129 The New Jersey 
Superior Court did, however, leave open the possibility that privileged records may 
be accessed in certain “compelling circumstances.”130 
Many state courts have upheld the privilege, but have alluded to 
circumstances under which the privilege would give way to some level of judicial 
review. In People v. Foggy,131 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld its victim-
counselor privilege in the face of defendant’s vague assertions that counseling 
records may possibly contain material information.132 This court recognized that 
Ritchie did not resolve “whether an absolute privilege must yield to a criminal 
defendant’s pretrial discovery request for otherwise privileged information that 
may provide material for use in cross-examining witnesses.”133 The court left open 
the consideration that certain circumstances would undercut the absolute nature of 
the privilege.134 Likewise, in State v. Pinder,135 a Florida court found that “a 
defendant must first establish a reasonable probability that the privileged matters 
contain material information necessary to his defense” before an in camera review 
would be conducted.136 
Other state courts reached the opposite conclusion, determining that when 
defendants make a sufficient showing that their constitutional rights may be 
harmed, the victim-counselor privilege must yield, regardless of its scope. In 
																																																								
124 109 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2005). 
125 Id. at 644–47. 
126 Id. at 646–47. 
127 Id. at 647. 
128 619 A.2d 232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
129 See id. at 237. 
130 Id. The Superior Court does not list what these “compelling circumstances” might 
be, but states “that there are situations in which the defendant’s constitutional rights are 
paramount and override the State’s policy of protecting records and documents from 
disclosure,” citing to Pennsylvania v. Ritchie and Davis v. Alaska as examples. Id. 
However, the Superior Court’s judgment is misplaced in suggesting that New Jersey’s 
statutory privilege may be susceptible to challenge under “compelling circumstances” like 
in Ritchie or Davis, as neither case dealt with an absolute privilege. See Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 n.14 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 311 (1974). 
131 521 N.E.2d 86 (Ill.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988). 
132 Id. at 92. 
133 Id. at 91. 
134 Id. at 92. 
135 678 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
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People v. Stanaway,137 the Michigan Supreme Court considered the scope of the 
state’s victim-counselor privilege, concluding the right was not absolute.138 The 
court found that the “prudent need to resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality” 
requires a trial court to conduct an in camera review of privileged information 
when a defendant “has a good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact, 
that there is a reasonable probability that the records are likely to contain material 
information necessary to the defense.”139 Alabama,140 Connecticut,141 Hawaii,142 
Indiana,143 Massachusetts,144 Montana,145 and Rhode Island146 have all advanced 
similar arguments that support a judicial in camera review of confidential 
communications to weigh the victim’s privacy interests against a defendant’s 
constitutional rights. 
Federal courts have also reached strikingly divergent results. In United States 
v. Shrader,147 a federal district court in West Virginia evaluated the issue, paying 
special attention to the considerations of victims’ rights. The court found that “the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subordinate to the Sixth Amendment rights 
																																																								
137 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994). 
138 See id. at 574. 
139 Id. 
140 Schaefer v. State, 676 So. 2d 947, 949 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that 
information subject to the victim-counselor privilege should be reviewed in camera). 
141 In re Robert H., 509 A.2d 475, 484 (Conn. 1986) (noting that when a defendant 
can show reasonable grounds that failure to produce privileged information will impair 
defendant’s right to confrontation, the victim’s testimony will be struck unless the victim 
consents to an in camera review for material information). 
142 State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 128, 134 (Haw. 2003) (determining that an in camera 
review, where the trial court weighed defendant’s need for privileged information against a 
victim’s statutory privilege, satisfied defendant’s right to due process). 
143 In re Subpoena to Crisis Connection, Inc., 930 N.E.2d 1169, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2010) (noting that requiring a defendant to meet a three-step test before conducting an in 
camera review creates a “proper balance between a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
rights and an alleged victim’s need for privacy”). 
144 Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 415, 417–19 (Mass. 2006) (noting that 
subpoena for confidential information from a third party may be obtained if it is relevant, 
not otherwise available, where the party seeking the information cannot properly prepare 
for trial, and where the information is sought in good faith; after notice and a hearing for 
the custodian of the records and the subject of the records, the records may be reviewed by 
defense counsel under a protective order, which may be modified for a specific, need-based 
reason). 
145 State v. Duffy, 6 P.3d 453, 458–59 (Mont. 2000) (holding that a trial court’s in 
camera review to “balance the defendant’s need for exculpatory evidence against the 
privacy interest of the victim” was sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights). 
146 Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161, 1166 (R.I. 
1983) (reviewing two proposed victim-counselor privilege proposals—including one 
absolute and one with an in camera review—and suggesting the in camera model “strikes 
the requisite balance between an accused’s constitutional right at trial and the sexual-
assault victim’s need for confidentiality”). 
147 716 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D. W. Va. 2010). 
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of Defendant” who sought a subpoena to produce the counseling records of the 
victim of stalking.148 It recognized that if “victims . . . have to choose whether to 
obtain counseling knowing [the defendant] can subpoena the records thereof there 
would be no choice at all.”149 Other federal courts have rejected the argument that 
privilege is secondary to defendant’s rights,150 even refusing to conduct an in 
camera review, finding it “a breach of the privilege.”151 
Still, other federal courts have reached the contrary conclusion. In Bassine v. 
Hill,152 the district court found the habeas petitioner’s right to cross-examine, 
confront, and due process outweighed psychotherapist-patient privilege.153 
Likewise, in United States v. Mazzola,154 a district court found the criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to effectively prepare and cross-examine a witness 
outweighed societal interests in guarding the confidentiality of communications 
between therapist and client.155 In United States v. Hansen,156 the court similarly 
found the defendant’s need for privileged information outweighed interests of the 
deceased victim and the public in preventing disclosure.157 
Due process, compulsory process, and confrontation issues may create limits 
on evidentiary privileges in criminal cases. The decision in Brady requires only 
that prosecutors or other state actors, not the victims of the crime, have a 
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence. The United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ritchie has left it unclear to what extent a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights must limit evidentiary privileges. In addressing these 
conflicting rights, state and federal courts have arrived at vastly different results 
from similar fact patterns. These antithetical conclusions demonstrate the need to 
look to Utah’s case law and underlying statutory provisions to better determine 
how Utah should apply its victim-counselor evidentiary privilege. 
 
																																																								
148 Id. at 472–73. 
149 Id. at 473. 
150 See, e.g., Johnson v. Norris, 537 F.3d 840, 845–47 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a state 
habeas petitioner’s argument that Confrontation Clause right was violated when trial court 
denied him access to psychiatric records of a witness); Newton v. Kemna, 354 F.3d 776, 
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IV.  STATE V. WORTHEN: DEMONSTRATING UTAH’S NEED FOR AN EXPANDED, 
ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE 
 
In addition to the privileges promulgated in the Utah Rules of Evidence,158 the 
Utah Legislature has established an absolute, though narrow, victim-counselor 
privilege by statute. The legislature passed the Confidential Communications for 
Sexual Assault Act159 “to enhance and promote the mental, physical and emotional 
recovery of victims of sexual assault and to protect the information given by 
victims to sexual assault counselors from being disclosed.”160 
This privilege is limited to those victims who have “experienced a sexual 
assault of whatever nature including incest and rape and requests counseling or 
assistance regarding the mental, physical, and emotional consequences of the 
sexual assault.”161 Any information that a victim gives to a sexual assault counselor 
is deemed confidential, including reports and working papers created in the course 
of the relationship.162 A sexual assault counselor is defined as “a person who is 
employed by or volunteers at a rape crisis center who has a minimum of [forty] 
hours of training in counseling and assisting victims of sexual assault.”163 
Generally, the victim is the only one who can permit disclosure. However, if the 
victim is a minor, the victim’s counselor may disclose the confidential 
communication.164 As none of the disclosure exceptions reference a defendant’s 
rights, Utah’s privilege can be categorized as absolute.165 
Victims of crimes other than sexual assault do not qualify under this privilege. 
Therefore, although a victim may be kidnapped and brutally beaten, if the 
defendant does not rape or sexually assault the victim, the victim cannot seek 
																																																								
158 See, e.g., UTAH R. EVID. 502 (recognizing a privilege between husband and wife); 
UTAH R. EVID. 503 (recognizing a privilege in communications to clergy); UTAH R. EVID. 
504 (recognizing a privilege between lawyer and client); UTAH R. EVID. 505 (recognizing a 
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159 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-201 (LexisNexis 2008). 
160 Id. § 77-38-202. 
161 Id. § 77-38-203(4). 
162 See id. § 77-38-203(1). 
163 Id. § 77-38-203(3). 
164 See id. § 77-38-204 (allowing disclosure when: “(1) the victim is a minor and the 
counselor believes it is in the best interest of the victim to disclose the confidential 
communication to the victim’s parents; (2) the victim is a minor and the minor’s parents or 
guardian have consented to disclosure of the confidential communication to a third party 
based upon representations made by the counselor that it is in the best interest of the minor 
victim to make such disclosure; (3) the victim is not a minor, has given consent, and the 
counselor believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish the desired result of 
counseling; or (4) the counselor has an obligation under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Child and 
Family Services, to report information transmitted in the confidential communication”). 
165 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
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protection under this privilege. Even where a victim is sexually assaulted but 
chooses to seek counseling from someone other than a sexual assault counselor—
such as a family doctor, psychologist, or school counselor—communications with 
those counselors also fall beyond this statutorily enabled privilege.166 
Utah’s psychotherapist-patient privilege may offer victims some protection. 
Communications made between a mental health therapist and a patient or victim 
are privileged if made “in confidence . . . for the purpose of diagnosing or treating 
the patient.”167 Under Utah law, a mental health therapist is defined as a licensed or 
certified “physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and 
family therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered 
psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor; and . . . is 
engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition . . . .”168 
While all victims receiving counseling can qualify for protection under Utah’s 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, it does not offer the absolute protections 
available under the Confidential Communications for Sexual Assault Act.169 
Utah’s psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute; it does not apply when a 
defendant asserts that the privileged communication is relevant to “the physical, 
mental, or emotional condition of the patient . . . in any proceeding in which that 
condition is an element of any claim or defense.”170 This has created a disparity in 
the rights of Utah victims. 
 
A.  Utah Case Law Foundations of the Victim-Counselor Privilege 
 
Several cases provide the underlying support and rationale for analyzing a 
victim’s privilege in Utah courts. In State v. Cardall,171 Richard Cardall was 
charged with raping his girlfriend’s eleven-year-old daughter, S.F.172 Following the 
assault, a school counselor administered an anxiety exam on S.F., during which 
she became “extremely upset” and began “crying out of control” during school.173 
Before trial, defendant requested an in camera review of S.F.’s school 
psychological records seeking review of the anxiety exam and information 
regarding another allegation the victim made regarding inappropriate touching by a 
school janitor.174 The trial court refused, noting that the records were privileged, 
and a jury ultimately convicted the defendant.175 Cardall appealed, alleging his due 
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process rights were violated for refusal to conduct an in camera review of the 
confidential school counseling records.176 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that the school counselor records were 
protected under the qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege—rather than 
absolute victim-counselor privilege.177 Following the analysis of Ritchie, the court 
determined that “if a defendant can show with reasonable certainty that 
exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to his defense,” an in 
camera review should be conducted to review the materiality of the evidence.178 
The court then examined whether the defendant had made a “general” or 
“specific” request for information in the privileged records.179 Rather than relying 
on a materiality standard, this “general” and “specific” analysis problematically 
“permits a defendant direct access to information he specifically requests and 
requires an in camera review for materiality when the defendant makes a general 
request for specific materials.”180 Here, the defendant was entitled to review the 
records and the court remanded with instructions to determine if the counseling 
records contained material information that would have changed the outcome of 
the trial.181 
Separately, in State v. Blake,182 the court denied defendant access to a victim’s 
confidential material for failure to show “with reasonable certainty that 
exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to [his] defense.”183 There, 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the defendant’s argument that “the pendulum 
has swung too far from the historically poor treatment of victims and reached the 
other end, treating defendants unjustly.”184 The court then fully explored the 
historical treatment that victims of rape have received in the law.185 
The court also recognized the expansion of victims’ rights, including the 
addition of privilege in rape crisis counseling and Utah’s rape shield law.186 The 
court also recognized that the victims’ rights amendment to Utah’s Constitution 
“provide[s] useful context for [the court’s] review of past and current treatment of 
rape and sexual assault victims.”187 The court was clear, however, that it did “not 
decide this case by resorting to Utah’s victims’ rights amendment.”188 
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Here, the statutory absolute privilege did not apply because the type of 
counseling the victim received was different from the “rape-crisis” counseling 
under Utah’s victim-counselor privilege.189 Thus, the court clarified the standard 
discussed in Cardall.190 Because the psychotherapist privilege is not absolute, 
certain circumstances exist where “a crime victim and her therapist might be 
subject to in camera review and disclosure.”191 
For example, the privilege might be limited if the defendant can show “with 
reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to 
[the] defense.”192 After an in camera review, the trial judge will find evidence 
material where “there is a reasonable probability that, if the evidence is disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding will be different.”193 
In State v. Gomez,194 the Utah Supreme Court determined whether the 
defendant had a right to a victim’s records from a rape crisis center.195 Though the 
defendant argued that due process required disclosure of the records, the court held 
that Ritchie was not controlling where the victim-counselor privilege as implicated 
here, rather than the psychotherapist-patient privilege, affords an absolute 
privilege.196 Because the defendant did not adequately brief these constitutional 
arguments, however, the Utah Supreme Court did not address these claims 
further.197 
The Utah Supreme Court has still not reached the issue of whether an absolute 
privilege must yield to a defendant’s constitutional rights. As the court’s decisions 
illustrate, the scope and breadth of Utah’s victim-counselor privilege begs for 
additional analysis in the face of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment claims. 
 
B.  The Utah Case: State v. Worthen 
 
In July of 2005, Mr. and Mrs. Worthen’s adopted thirteen-year-old daughter, 
B.W., “attempted suicide and was admitted to the inpatient program at the 
University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute.”198 After weeks of counseling and 
therapy, B.W. was released into her parents’ care and “began outpatient counseling 
with Dr. Carolyn Henry . . . . During this time, B.W. kept a journal in which she 
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In October of 2005, B.W. told Dr. Henry that her adoptive father “had 
repeatedly sexually abused her.”200 In turn, Dr. Henry “reported the allegation to 
authorities” as required by Utah law.201 As a result of these allegations, the state 
charged Mr. Worthen with ten counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child.202 
Mr. Worthen filed a motion seeking an in camera review of B.W.’s medical 
and therapy records from July through October of 2005.203 Specifically, Mr. 
Worthen sought review to search for “B.W.’s denial of abuse by Mr. Worthen, . . . 
‘cognitive problems and major misinterpretation problems,’ and . . . a motive to 
fabricate the allegations stemming from her hatred of her parents.”204 
Conceding that the records were within Utah’s doctor-patient privilege and 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, Mr. Worthen argued that the records fell under 
an exception to these evidentiary privileges.205 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
a communication is exempt from the psychotherapist privilege if it is “relevant to 
an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense.”206 
The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Worthen.207 After the State petitioned for 
interlocutory review, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order 
granting in camera review.208 The State and the Office of Guardian ad Litem—
appointed to represent B.W.’s interest—successfully petitioned the Utah Supreme 
Court for review.209 
One question certified for review, among others, was “whether the court of 
appeals erred by failing to consider constitutional and statutory provisions relating 
to a victim’s rights.”210 The Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic, in conjunction with 
the National Crime Victim Law Institute, filed an amicus brief addressing this 
issue. They argued that the court of appeals had erred in affirming the trial court 
because it had failed to “meet its general obligation to ensure the fair 
administration of justice and its specific obligations to victims under state law.”211 
Furthermore, the amicus curiae argued that a victim has a constitutional right 
to fair and sensitive treatment, that the vigorous protection of the victim’s rights 
were violated, and that any properly raised issue of victims’ rights must be 
																																																								






206 UTAH R. EVID. 506(d)(1). 
207 Worthen, 222 P.3d at 1148. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1149. 
210 Id. 
211 What Ever Happened with That Case I Worked On at NCVLI?, NAT’L CRIME 
VICTIM L. INST., http://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/news/ 
story/?id=5531/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
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considered on appeal.212 These rights, the amici argued, were particularly 
important given the “extra consideration for her interests as a child.”213 Most 
notably, however, the amici highlighted the fact that “[t]his case brings into stark 
relief the need for courts to explicitly consider the independent constitutional and 
statutory rights of crime victims when ruling on requests for their privileged 
counseling records.”214 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not share this view. While the court 
recognized that the court of appeals did not address the relevance of the Utah 
Constitution’s victims’ rights amendment or state victims’ rights statutes to a trial 
court’s examination of these evidentiary decisions, it held the failure to address 
was not erroneous.215 The court reasoned that these issues had not been properly 
presented on appeal, and therefore need not be addressed because the trial court did 
not make an adverse ruling on victims’ rights grounds.216 The court found the 
reliance on Utah’s Rights of Crime Victims Act217 as grounds for appellate court 
review of any victims’ rights issue was misplaced.218 The court also noted that it 
could not decide the issue, as it had not been properly preserved.219 
But even though the court declined to rule on the crime victims’ issue, it 
hinted that victims’ rights “support considerable policy-based arguments” 
justifying a victim’s evidentiary privilege.220 Perhaps forecasting future decisions, 
the Utah Supreme Court further referenced its decisions in State v. Gonzales221 and 
State v. Blake as possible underlying support for an increased deference to  
victims’ rights. 
The court also upheld the “reasonable certainty test,” which requires only that 
a defendant establish that records exist and show with reasonable certainty—that 
is, “more likely than not”222—that the records may have exculpatory evidence 
favorable to his defense.223 Once proven, the records are subject to judicial in 
camera review.224 The defense will obtain access to the records if there is a 
																																																								
212 Brief for National Crime Victim Law Institute and Utah Crime Victims Legal 
Clinic as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2–3, State v. Worthen, 222 P.3d 1144 
(Utah 2008) (No. 20080128). 
213 Id. at 10. 
214 Id. at 16. 
215 Worthen, 222 P.3d at 1157. 
216 Id. 
217 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 (LexisNexis 2008). Specifically, section 77-38-
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including issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade review.” Id. 
218 Worthen, 222 P.3d at 1157. 
219 Id. at 1157–58. 
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“reasonable probability that, if the evidence is disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding will be different.”225 
As many states have done, the Utah Legislature provided some limited 
groundwork for a victim-counselor privilege. Utah’s case law also recognizes the 
absolute nature of Utah’s limited privilege between crime victims and rape-crisis 
counselors in addition to the underlying policy reasons supporting this evidentiary 
privilege. 
As Worthen demonstrates, there is still need for states to refine their privilege 
by expanding its scope. State legislatures, including the Utah Legislature, should 
recognize the legitimate interests underlying an absolute, expanded privilege, the 
constitutional and statutory protections offered to all crime victims, and the 
constitutional rights of privacy. 
 
V.  PUBLIC POLICY, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, AND PRIVACY INTERESTS SUPPORT AN 
ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE 
 
The argument that the victim-counselor privilege is applicable only when a 
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are not implicated is perverse. Holding 
this privilege as secondary to the Sixth Amendment is contrary to other similar 
privileges—if not, would not the attorney-client privilege often yield to a criminal 
defendant’s cross-examination needs? Exceptions to the victim-counselor 
privilege, even in the Sixth Amendment context, would “eviscerate the 
effectiveness of the privilege.”226 
The justifications for the victim-counselor privilege mirror the rationales for 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. All relationship-oriented evidentiary 
privileges, including the victim-counselor privilege, are “rooted in the imperative 
need for confidence and trust.”227 Courts have also recognized the importance that 
these confidential communications have on the effectiveness of counseling.228 In 
addition to the policy considerations supporting privileges in general, state 
constitutional amendments229 and state and federal legislation granting rights to 
crime victims also support an absolute victim-counselor privilege. Lastly, 
constitutional privacy rights help ensure the confidentiality of victims’ 
communications and records made during counseling. State legislatures should 
guarantee, and state supreme courts should likewise recognize, that all crime 
victims have an absolute right to communicate confidentially with their counselors 
during the course of their treatment. 
																																																								
225 Id. at 1156. 
226 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). 
227 Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
228 See, e.g., Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 120 P.3d 820, 825 (N.M. 
2005); People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 643 (Colo. 2005). 
229 While several federal constitutional amendments have been proposed, none have 
received sufficient congressional support, but this may be so for reasons other than their 
merits. See Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, With Disdain for the Constitutional 
Craft: The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment, 78 N.C. L. REV. 371, 372–73 (2000). 
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A.  States’ Compelling Interests in an Absolute Victim-Counselor Privilege 
 
There are considerable policy interests for adopting an absolute victim-
counselor testimonial privilege for the victim of any crime, beyond the traditional 
protections offered to child abuse and sexual assault victims, who seeks counseling 
as a result of their injury. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court so aptly noted, even 
the balancing of a privilege against a defendant’s rights “would, in effect, destroy 
the right which the privilege sought to protect.”230 
The underlying policy rationales for the victim-counselor privilege are largely 
an extension of rationales offered for the well-established psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, as recognized by many courts. In Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. 
Blackmer,231 the New Mexico Supreme Court noted, “The rationales underlying 
the statutory victim-counselor privilege echo those underlying the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.”232 Likewise, in United States v. Lowe,233 a federal district court 
analyzed Massachusetts’s victim-counselor privilege as an expansion of the 
psychotherapist privilege.234 
This argument is often couched in terms of economic ability, with the victim-
counselor privilege providing an extension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
to nonlicensed social workers that provide for victims who cannot otherwise afford 
the services of a licensed psychotherapist.235 For example, victims may receive 
counseling from social workers employed at free or low cost rape crisis centers or 
domestic violence shelters.236 
Although these service centers are often publicly funded, they typically do not 
require personnel to undergo the same professional licensing or credentialing as 
traditional psychotherapists.237 As one court noted, “It would make little sense for 
victims of rape to be deprived of the privilege because they seek help from victim 
counselors at a rape crisis center, while victims with the resources to seek help 
from a licensed psychologist would benefit from the privilege.”238 
Utah courts have found that privileges are designed to encourage “a full and 
complete disclosure . . . in order to receive effective medical treatment.”239 When 
discussing the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, the United States Supreme 
Court noted that successful psychological treatment 
																																																								
230 Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), appeal 
denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992). 
231 120 P.3d 820 (N.M. 2005). 
232 See id. at 826. 
233 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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235 See Bridget M. McCafferty, The Existing Confidentiality Privileges as Applied to 
Rape Victims, 5 J.L. & HEALTH 101, 118 (1991). 
236 See id. 
237 Robinson, supra note 10, at 339. 
238 Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 120 P.3d 820, 826 (N.M. 2005). 
239 State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient 
is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, 
memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for 
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential 
communications made during counseling sessions may cause 
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of 
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship 
necessary for successful treatment.240 
 
Likewise, other courts have recognized the adverse effects that disclosing a 
patient’s communications has on the patient’s recovery. In Kalenevitch v. 
Finger,241 the court noted, “Patient confidence is essential for effective 
treatment.”242 Additionally, “because the information revealed by the patient is 
extremely personal, the threat of disclosure to outsiders may cause the patient to 
hesitate or even refrain from seeking treatment.”243 Therefore, “without the 
confidentiality which the privilege provides, many people would simply forego 
therapeutic treatment.”244 
The victim-counselor privilege, for example, would help remedy the “extreme 
underreporting” of rape.245 Sexual assault victims often suffer a wide range of 
emotional and psychological trauma.246 As one court recognized, victims of sexual 
assault and rape suffer a degree of trauma “far beyond that experienced by victims 
of other crimes.”247 Crisis centers assist individuals in recovery by providing crisis 
intervention services, initial and follow-up counseling, and medical and legal 
advice.248 
Proponents of the privilege argue, “Without assurances of confidentiality, 
sexual assault and domestic violence victims will be reluctant to contact rape crisis 
centers and battered women’s shelters.”249 Without the counseling services these 
centers provide, such victims “may be hesitant to report crimes and aid in their 
																																																								
240 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996). 
241 595 A.2d 1224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
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prosecution. The effects will likely be felt by the victim’s children, resulting in a 
cycle of abuse that will harm society for decades to come.”250 
As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Blake, there are strong policy 
considerations that lend support to an absolute victim-counselor privilege.251 An 
absolute privilege seeks to prevent “victims from being needlessly embarrassed or 
harassed during the trial process.”252 This includes the prohibition of introducing 
evidence about the victim that shifts attention “of a criminal trial from an inquiry 
into the conduct of the offender to that of the moral worth of the complainant.”253 
As one scholar noted specific to the sexual assault context, “Allowing defendants 
to use a victim’s psychiatric history when they are unable to use her sexual history 
will ensure that rape victims continue to possess ‘a significantly higher chance than 
did victims of any other major felony of seeing their accusations deemed 
unfounded.’”254 
Notably in Worthen, if the victim had gone to a domestic abuse shelter and 
sought counseling from someone who was arguably less qualified than a licensed 
psychotherapist, she would have come under the protections of Utah’s victim-
counselor privilege. This would have qualified the victim for an absolute privilege 
and, under current law, would have precluded Mr. Worthen from accessing the 
victim’s confidential records. 
The absurdity that victims of the same crime could receive full confidential 
protection under one privilege and be exposed under another privilege by ignoring 
victims’ statutory and constitutional rights underscores the need for Utah to 
address the scope and extent of a victim’s right to confidential communication. 
Additionally, though crimes of sexual assault, child abuse, and rape are 
particularly heinous, if the results of an assault, an attempted murder, or other 
crimes are so serious as to result in the need for a victim’s counseling, much of the 
same logic that supports the rape-counselor privilege applies equally to these other 
crimes. 
If fully adopted in practice, an absolute victim-counselor privilege still 
protects a defendant’s rights. Defendants maintain the ability both to cross-
examine and introduce other witnesses to impeach credibility.255 This right “does 
not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of” counseling records 




251 See supra text accompanying notes 182–193. 
252 Robinson, supra note 10, at 359. Additionally, this interest is a victim’s guaranteed 
constitutional right. See infra text accompanying notes 272–286. 
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Defendants retain the ability to confront the victim at trial, and that is 
sufficient under the Confrontation Clause.257 Furthermore, “[h]ow a victim 
emotionally responds to traumatic experience has no bearing on whether a [crime] 
occurred or whether the defendant was the [criminal]. The defendant’s [S]ixth 
[A]mendment rights are not diminished by limiting his subpoena power.”258 And 
even if there were relevant information protected by the privilege, “[t]he small 
amount of relevant information the [crime] victim might convey to the [therapist] 
is almost certainly obtainable from other sources and, in any event, would be 
highly prejudicial.”259 
 
B.  Victims Have (Constitutional) Rights Too 
 
Beyond the state’s compelling policy considerations for evidentiary privileges 
and the protections for defendants, Utah courts should consider the rights that 
victims have under broader state constitutional amendments and crime victims’ 
rights legislation. As an initial matter, crime victims’ rights should be viewed 
together with or against a defendant’s constitutional rights to seek the information, 
not subordinate to them. 
As an example of the more broad victims’ rights legislation, Congress enacted 
the Crime Victims Rights Act of 2004.260 This legislation codified protections for 
victims’ rights in federal prosecutions.261 It mandates that victims be “reasonably 
protected from the accused,”262 and treated with “fairness and with respect for the 
victim’s dignity and privacy.”263 Thirty-two states have added some form of crime 
victims’ rights to their state constitutions.264 
These constitutional rights can be classified as providing either broad or 
specific rights and protections.265 The more broadly defined rights include 
“victims’ rights to fairness, respect, dignity, privacy, freedom from abuse, due 
process and [a right to] reasonable protection.”266 The more specific rights exist in 
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the areas of due process, protection, and privacy.267 For example, a crime victim’s 
due process rights may require notice and the opportunity to be heard when 
privileged records are to be subjected to a subpoena. When the government’s 
decision deprives “property” or “liberty” interests, the “‘[p]arties whose rights are 
to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right 
they must first be notified’ . . . ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’”268 
The Utah Legislature intended “to ensure that all victims and witnesses of 
crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity, and that the rights 
[of victims] . . . are honored and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous 
than protections afforded criminal defendants.”269 Accordingly, courts may not, 
“in the administration of criminal justice . . . ignore the concerns of victims.”270 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this principle, noting that “prosecutors must 
defend and uphold the State’s interest in procuring justice, [and] they have an 
obligation to ensure that the constitutional rights of crime victims are honored and 
protected.”271 
Crime victims deserve fairness, respect, dignity, due process, and freedom 
from abuse.272 Unnecessary exposure of a victim’s private communications made 
during the course of treatment allows the defendant to further victimize the injured 
party, this time with the tacit approval of the criminal justice system. Equal 
consideration should be given to victims’ constitutional rights. Allowing a 
defendant to access victims’ counseling records “would only open the door to 
further victimization.”273 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
disclosure of confidential communications “may cause embarrassment or 
disgrace.”274 Courts in Utah have found that privileges are designed to encourage 
“a full and complete disclosure . . . free from the embarrassment [of 
disclosure].”275 This revictimization is an injury to the victims, impermissible 
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Forced disclosure of privileged records and conversations violates a victim’s 
right to be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity. Attempts to shift 
attention from the conduct of the defendant to the moral worth of the victim should 
not be permissible under any circumstance. Requiring victims to relive the crime 
by disclosing the records and communications of their counseling where a 
defendant makes only the low requisite showing of reasonable evidence, and even 
a less intrusive in camera review at trial, cuts against these considerations. 
The ability to obtain records through the use of a reasonable certainty test, as 
used in Utah and other jurisdictions, fails to adequately incorporate the 
constitutional interests of an individual victim in its analysis. This test only gives 
an interest to the victim after granting a defendant the primary interest in showing, 
with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the records may be exculpatory.278 
The forced disclosure of privileged records and conversations violates a 
victim’s right to be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity. This 
revictimization is an injury to the victim and is impermissible under Utah’s Rights 
of Crime Victims Act. 
 
C.  Constitutional Privacy Interests 
 
Constitutional privacy interests are also a consideration in the victim-
counselor confidentiality privilege. Six states have chosen to amend their 
constitutions to expressly grant crime victims the right to privacy.279 The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that the federal Constitution ensures an 
individual’s right to privacy.280 Other courts have recognized an individual’s 
privacy right in a variety of contexts related to counseling and mental health 
treatment. For example, in N.O. v. Callahan,281 a district court identified privacy 
interests in the treatment and care of mentally ill patients.282 
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Not only are the communications and records themselves recognized within 
this privacy right, a victim also has privacy interests in “avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”283 Many crime victims’ statutes and state constitutional 
amendments endow victims with a right to privacy.284 For example, Utah has 
recognized “the general proposition that there is and should be such a [privacy] 
right which protects against any wrongful or unseemly intrusion into what should 
properly be regarded as one’s personal affairs.”285 Moreover, Utah courts have 
recognized that a right to privacy protects a victim’s medical records.286 
This liberty interest, recognized in both federal and state constitutional 
guarantees of a right to privacy, must weigh against the unwanted mandatory 
disclosure of therapy records. If defendants can request a victim’s mental health or 
psychological records, the victim’s “constitutional privacy right . . . would be 
gutted.”287 At least one scholar has argued that where the privilege is based on 
victims’ constitutional privacy rights, it is “less vulnerable to [S]ixth [A]mendment 
challenges than a similar statutory privilege.”288 
 
VI.  UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE A VICTIM’S RIGHT  
TO CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
 
While victims’ rights have made considerable advances in recent decades, 
challenges still exist before a crime victim is fully respected within the criminal 
justice system. The victim-counselor privilege, however, is one area where 
victims’ rights must improve. This privilege is necessary to protect 
communications and records between the victims of crimes and their crisis 
counselors and therapists. 
A criminal defendant’s right to due process, compulsory process, and 
confrontation are, at times, in conflict with this privilege. Federal courts have 
failed to address the issue and provide uniformity, as the United States Supreme 
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Court’s controlling decision in Ritchie leaves the scope of the privilege vague. 
Additionally, at the state level, a patchwork of approaches exists addressing 
victims’ confidential communications, ranging from states offering no protections 
at all, to states providing an absolute privilege. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
faced this issue in State v. Worthen. Although the court declined to rule on the 
issue, it hinted that the ultimate determination of whether Utah’s victims’ rights 
protections should outweigh a criminal defendant’s rights was ripe for judicial 
review. 
The Utah example provides a powerful illustration of the need for an 
expanded privilege. The Utah Legislature should broaden the privilege in Utah’s 
Confidential Communications for Sexual Assault Act. This change would ensure 
that the victims of crimes, especially child abuse and sexual assault, are given the 
absolute protections the Utah Legislature intended to give them, regardless of their 
circumstantial or economic ability to acquire treatment. While Utah recognizes the 
need to protect victims of sexual assault and child abuse, victims of other crimes 
that seek treatment by mental health professionals or therapists warrant similar 
protections, regardless of the perceived heinousness of the crime they endured. 
The privilege should encompass any crime victim’s confidential 
communications made during treatment with any counselor—whether it is a mental 
health professional, psychotherapist, social worker, or a rape crisis counselor. As 
one scholar warned, “[W]ithout a bright-line rule barring admissibility of these 
records, victims’ rights will not exist in practice.”289 Thus, “[a]n absolute bar 
against admitting this evidence . . . establishes a clear rule that protects all 
victims.”290 
Considerable policy reasons exist supporting victims’ rights to confidential 
communications. The underlying policy rationales of privileges generally—and the 
rationales for the victims of crimes specifically—combined with broader victims’ 
statutory rights, constitutional rights, and constitutional privacy interests, all 
provide substantial justification for adopting an absolute victims’ privilege. While 
the rights granted to victims may vary from state to state, a state’s policy interests 
in privileges and underlying statutory and constitutional victims’ rights all support 
an absolute victim-counselor privilege. These victims’ rights should be viewed 
together with or against a defendant’s constitutional rights, not subordinate to 
them. In states where the court has, through judicial fiat, limited an absolute 
privilege, state legislatures should move to expand a victim’s protections wherever 
possible, whether it is done through legislation or constitutional amendment. 
While this expansion of the victim-counselor privilege may not answer all 
problems associated with a crime victim’s privilege, it would be an encouraging 
and principled step in protecting crime victims from revictimization in our judicial 
system and recognizing a victim’s constitutional rights. Utahans deserve a 
privilege that guarantees victims of crime are treated with dignity, respect, 
courtesy, and sensitivity and finally ensures that crime victims are honored and 
																																																								
289 Robinson, supra note 10, at 362. 
290 Id. at 363. 
2013] UTAH’S NEED FOR AN ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE 155 
 
protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to 
criminal defendants. 
